The ongoing war in Gaza was prompted by the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7th, 2023, which killed around 1,200 Israelis. At least 250 individuals were also taken hostage, around 100 of whom are still unaccounted for. A year after Hamas’ terror attack, the conflict in the Middle East has spread beyond Gaza and tensions have escalated across the region. Israel appears to have shifted its strategy from containment to a more aggressive approach, aimed to degrade or incapacitate both Hamas and Hezbollah, and potentially the entirety of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ to the point where they are effectively unable to respond. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to stop attacks like the October 2023 Hamas attack from happening again, saying that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) are ‘changing the security reality of the region.’ Netanyahu has also spoken about the elimination of the Islamic Republic as the only real way of dealing with the threats against Israel and recently said that ‘when Iran is finally free, and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think – everything will be different.’
The war in Gaza
Netanyahu has stated that the goal of the ongoing war in Gaza is the ‘destruction of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities.’ According to Yoav Gallant, Israel’s Minister of Defence, 60% of Hamas fighters have been killed or wounded, which means that the remainder have either blended in with the civilian population or continue to hide in tunnels and are likely to continue fighting.
To date, Israel has eliminated almost all Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 2023 attack, on October 17th, 2024. While Yahya Sinwar’s death revived hopes of a ceasefire, Netanyahu warned that the war in Gaza was not over until the remaining hostages have been returned. The next phases of fighting and any ceasefire agreements will depend on Hamas’ next leader; currently Yahya Sinwar’s brother Mohammed Sinwar, who recently took over as Hamas’ military commander, has been put forward as a potential successor and is expected to continue his brother’s hard-line tactics. Regardless of who the next leader may be, Israel considers incapacitating Hamas as the only way of preventing another major terrorist attack by the group or an insurgency in post-war Gaza.
What this post-war Gaza could look like is also under debate, especially the reconstruction and governance of Gaza, for which Israel has ruled out Hamas in any capacity. A multinational peacekeeping force has reportedly been considered, but Hamas is likely to reject a foreign or multinational peacekeeping force of any kind. The war in Gaza has also resulted in a catastrophic humanitarian crisis with massive food shortages and rampant spread of diseases. Delivering humanitarian aid has been increasingly difficult since the war began. This is now also causing tensions between Israel and the United States, with the latter threatening restrictions on US military aid if Israel does not allow more humanitarian aid into Gaza.
Wider regional impact of the war in Gaza
By now, the conflict is having a much wider impact beyond Gaza. Soon after Hamas’ terror attack, Hezbollah began launching missile attacks against Israel. The Houthis have also launched missile attacks against Israel, including a hypersonic missile on September 15th, 2024, although this claim has been disputed. Israel responded in late September 2024 with airstrikes against power stations, oil reserves, and ports controlled by the Houthis. At the same time, tensions between Israel and Iran have also escalated, with multiple missile strikes carried out by both countries. Recently, documents reportedly seized by the IDF have emerged that suggest Hamas held secret meetings with Hezbollah and Iran in an attempt to persuade both to assist and participate in the attack. The documents also suggest that Hamas’ goal is the destruction of Israel, rather than achieving a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Iran has denied any involvement, saying that any such documents are ‘fabricated’ and ‘based on Zionist lies.’
The Hamas attack and the war it triggered has also put a hold on the normalisation efforts between Israel and the Arab countries. The war in Gaza has reversed years of progress in the relationship between Egypt and Israel, with tensions peaking after Israel took over of the Philadelphi Corridor in May 2024, despite warnings from Egypt that this was ‘a red line.’ However, RAND experts argue that, while the public cares about the Palestinian fight, government leaders in many Arab countries view Hamas and Hezbollah as a potential threat to their own regimes. Iran’s backing of both groups, as well as the Houthis, has also led to complications in relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, who view Iran’s involvement as a threat to regional stability.
The fighting in Lebanon
Hezbollah has been regularly launching attacks against Israel, more recently ones that combine missiles and drones, in an apparent attempt to overwhelm Israel’s air defences. Israel has responded by targeting Hezbollah hideouts in Lebanon directly, marking the first instance of direct clashes since 2006. The recent attacks in Lebanon suggest that Israel has shifted from a containment strategy to a more aggressive approach of seeking to incapacitate Hezbollah as a military force, similar to its goal with Hamas. The 2023 Hamas attack appears to have significantly changed Israel’s risk tolerance, with the country’s leaders likely wondering what Hezbollah, considered to be a much better organised and armed group than Hamas, might be capable of, if Hamas was able to execute such an operation.
Recently, Israel dramatically increased its operations against Hezbollah. Thousands of Hezbollah pagers and communication equipment detonated in two waves of attacks over two days starting September 17th, 2024. The attacks, attributed to Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad, killed at least 32 people, severely injured around 1,500 Hezbollah fighters and disrupted the group’s communications systems. The attacks were followed by airstrikes that have killed at least seven high-ranking Hezbollah commanders and reportedly destroyed half of the group’s missile arsenal. This includes Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an airstrike on the group’s Beirut headquarters. By October 1st, 2024, the IDF crossed the border into Lebanon and more recently, on October 21st, 2024, Israel launched airstrikes against the Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association (AQAH), a Hezbollah-affiliated bank in Lebanon that both Israel and the US have accused of being a cover for Hezbollah for financing its operations. Some Israeli officials have spoken of re-establishing the ‘security zone’ in south Lebanon, controlled by Israel from 1978 to 2000, to ensure that Hezbollah cannot reach the border.
Although Israel has significantly eroded Hezbollah’s capabilities and the group is allegedly in disarray, the level of damage it has sustained remains unclear. Prior to the latest Israeli strikes, the group was believed to possess an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles, including precision-guided missiles. Iran continues to supply Hezbollah with weapons and allegedly provides $700 million in funding annually. Hezbollah has recently employed more advanced systems that it has not previously used, for example, they used a Qadir-1 missile to target the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on September 25th, 2024. While the missile was intercepted, the attack has been seen as a warning, with Hezbollah signalling that it can target Israel’s capital and largest city. More recently, on October 22nd, 2024, Hezbollah targeted a military intelligence base near Tel Aviv and a naval base near Haifa, and on October 13th, 2024, the IDF Golani Brigade’s base, which is 40 miles into Israel, was hit in a drone attack that killed four soldiers and injured more than 60, marking the deadliest attack on the IDF inside Israel since the beginning of the war.
Iran and Israel
Although Iran has mostly stayed out of the Israel-Hamas war, the tensions escalated significantly after April 1st, 2024, when a suspected IDF airstrike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus killed eight senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders. Iran responded two weeks later by launching around 300 missiles, its first direct attack against Israel in history. Israel’s air defences, aided by the US and some Arab countries, shot down nearly all the missiles. The conflict saw a further escalation on October 1st, 2024, when Iran launched nearly 200 missiles against Israel. Iran said the attack was in response to Israel assassinating Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, as well as the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and an IRGC general in Beirut in September. Although Israel’s air defences, aided by the US navy, intercepted most of the missiles, some struck central and southern Israel, according to the IDF.
On October 26th, 2024, Israel responded to Iran’s earlier attacks with strikes against military targets, including the country’s air defences and missile manufacturing facilities, though avoiding oil production and nuclear sites. Iran has downplayed the impact, claiming its air defences had successfully countered the attack, which reportedly only caused ‘limited damage.’ While both the US and Israel have expressed concerns about a possible Iranian retaliation and Hossein Salami, IRGC’s commander-in-chief, warned Israel of ‘bitter consequences’, Israel’s restrained attack has been seen as providing Iran with an ‘off-ramp’ to de-escalate. According to some media reports, Israel sent messages to Iran ahead of the attack, warning that any retaliation would be met by another, more significant attack. The US administration was also informed prior to the attack and has reportedly messaged Iran that this should be the end of exchanges between the two countries. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated on October 27th, 2024, that the ‘evil actions’ by the Israeli government ‘should neither be exaggerated nor downplayed,’ indicating caution and restraint in response.
Military officials and analysts have noted that the previous missile and drone attacks by Iran and Hezbollah have saturated Israel’s air defences, allowing some of them to get through and hit the targets. They have also warned that Israel might be facing a shortage of interceptor missiles as the recent attacks have depleted its stockpiles and defence companies are struggling to meet the increased demand. To counter this threat, the US announced on October 13th, 2024, that the country had deployed a US-manned Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system in Israel.
Despite the recent strikes, Iran appears to continue to be cautious to prevent provoking a full-scale retaliation. Some experts argue that Iran is holding Hezbollah back from launching a campaign of long-range strikes against Israel using its more sophisticated systems. Iran’s caution may have led to frustration among Hezbollah who want to use the more advanced weapons to inflict real damage on Israel. Many hard-line conservatives in Iran and IRGC high-ranking officers have also been growing uneasy about the country’s lack of action, as Israel has been fighting Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, all of which are members of Iran’s so-called ‘Axis of Resistance.’
Strained international relations
The current conflict has also put Israel’s relationship with the US under pressure. The US has engaged in near-constant diplomacy to negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, however, following a brief ceasefire in November 2023, subsequent rounds of peace talks have failed to make progress. Israel’s relations with the US have suffered because of the perception that Israel has not taken sufficient care to avoid killing civilians, a notion that is echoed by various other nations. The US now appears to be moving from unequivocal support for Israel to frustration and disappointment about the way Israel is conducting the war in Gaza.
The conflict has affected Israel’s international image and has complicated its relationship with other countries typically in strong support of its actions, with tensions surfacing over how Israel has been pursuing its objectives. Despite the near-constant diplomatic initiatives, a lasting ceasefire has proven difficult to achieve. The role that international mediators can play is limited and there are few deals Netanyahu’s government would accept that would also be acceptable to Hamas or Hezbollah, and vice versa, with both sides seeing this as an existential struggle and deeply seated hostility preventing any lasting peace.
Closing thoughts on the war in the Gaza and the Hamas attacks
With just over a year since the initial Hamas attack, Israel appears to be shifting from deterring to dismantling the capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, and potentially the Houthis to the point that they cannot effectively pose a threat, sparking concerns about a wider regional war. Ultimately, the peace in the Middle East depends on the ability of its leaders to prioritise dialogue and cooperation over aggression. The current failure to do so risks perpetuating the cycle of violence, with consequences for the wider region and the world.
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